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Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since February 1952.
Most of the allied countries, and the United States 
in particular, have long seen Turkey as their “sta-
unch ally” thanks to its significant contributions to 
the security and defense of the West against the 
threats posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold 
war era.
Yet, there have been tough times as well in this 
relationship, especially when Turkey and Greece 
have been at odds with each other over a host 
of issues, either in Cyprus or in the Aegean that 
brought the two NATO allies to the brink of hot 
confrontation.
There were also heavy criticisms towards Turkey, 
time and again, from the leading members of 
the Alliance, such as the one that surfaced pri-
or to and during the Lisbon Summit in November 
2010 where the “Missile Shield” was a key issue 
on the agenda and Turkey was (wrongly) blamed 
for obstructing the implementation of the project, 
which was not the case, at all.
Despite ups and downs in the alliance relations, 
neither Turks, nor their Western allies have felt the 
need to call Turkey’s membership into question 
until recently.
The tide seems to have turned several years ago, 
especially when Turkey sought cooperation and 
collaboration with China over the procurement 
of air defense systems, after a series of failed at-
tempts to do so from its Western allies. 
The situation has further deteriorated with the sig-
ning of the contract between Turkey and Russia 
over the sale of an elaborate air defense system, 
namely the S-400s.
This controversy between Turkey and the allied 
countries had ramifications as well as repercus-
sions, particularly, in the public domains of both 
sides. 
Voices have been heard, for instance, among the 
Turks, questioning NATO’s added value to Tur-
key’s security and defense, as well as among the 
Westerners, suggesting taking a tougher stance 
against Turkey so as to punish its initiatives to col-
laborate with the rivals of the Alliance like China 
and Russia.
But, the tone of criticism towards each other re-
ached its peak in the aftermath of the coup at-
tempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016 by a group of 
military officers who have long been embedded 
in the Turkish Armed Forces, but who were inde-
ed devoted members of a cult, now labeled as the 
“Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ)”.
Because, the coup plotters used, among others, 
the refueling aircraft that belonged to the Turkish 
Air Force, but allocated to NATO operations over 
the Syrian airspace and thus stationed at the In-
cirlik base, operated largely by the US military.
This incident gave way to endless and relentless 
accusations among the Turks, of all walks of life 
and all ranks, towards NATO of being complicit 
with the coup plotters in order to topple the de-
mocratically elected government in Turkey.
Hence, the value of NATO as an organization that 
was supposed to enhance Turkey’s security as 
well as to protect its sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity has lost almost all of its currency among 
Turkish citizens.
Interestingly, the very same incident has also 
become the source of serious concerns among 
a number of “security experts” in the West who 
frequently argued that the tactical nuclear wea-
pons, which belong to the United States, but sta-
tioned at the Incirlik base, were not anymore safe 
and that they should be withdrawn from Turkey 
immediately.
Some have even gone farther away to argue that 
the Turkish government would seize these nuclear 
weapons and use against the US and/or its part-
ner countries, such as Israel and the Gulf monar-
chies in the Middle East.
These security “analysts” argued that Turkey 
would no more deserve the positive security as-
surances provided by its NATO allies and that it 
should be “kicked out” of the Alliance at an early 
date.
The Brussels Summit of the Alliance to be conve-
ned on July 11-12, 2018, on the days this article 
is being finalized, will hopefully not feature such 
groundless accusations or meaningless argu-
ments on its agenda.
But, outside this official sphere, some “experts” 
on NATO issues will most likely continue to propa-
gate their “analyses” and their conclusions as to 
how Turkey has become a security burden for the 
West and why the members of the Alliance should 
alienate it.
Amid such debates, both inside and outside of 
the country, as to whether Turkey should continue 
to be a NATO ally, this article will discuss, in Part I, 
how, indeed, Turkey’s membership in the Alliance 
has created major obstructions in its fight against 
The Strategist - 2018/2
9
terrorism for decades since the late 1970s and, in Part II, how Turkish governments have found their 
own solutions, in one way or another, by seizing the opportunities that emerged out of the conjunctural 
changes taking place in the world, without tangible support coming from their allies.
Part I - Limitations Caused by Turkey’s NATO Membership in its Fight Against PKK Terrorism
The most important challenge that Turkey had to deal with, during the 1980s and the most part of the 
1990s, was rather the wide-ranging support that was given to the PKK primarily by Turkey’s immediate 
neighbors to its south, namely Syria, Iraq, and also Iran, to some extent. 
From the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, Turkey’s counterterro-
rism efforts were significantly undermined because of the limitati-
ons that Turkey faced in deterring the countries that have suppor-
ted the PKK.
These limitations, however, were not necessarily emanating from 
Turkey’s weaknesses politically or economically, or lack of military 
capabilities. 
Limitations caused by NATO’s Strategies on Turkey’s Force 
Posture 
Turkey’s inability to deter its southern neighbors from providing 
shelter and all sorts of logistical support to the PKK was mainly 
stemming from its responsibilities within the North Atlantic Allian-
ce.
This may, at first, sound as a highly controversial statement, and 
one may ask “how in the world NATO membership would negati-
vely affect the ability Turkey, being a ‘staunch ally’ and doing its 
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utmost to contribute to the defense of 
the North Atlantic Alliance, to effecti-
vely fight against PKK terrorism?”
For this to be properly understood, one 
must explain how Turkey’s role in the 
Alliance strategies undermined, unin-
tentionally though, its capacity to deter 
its southern neighbors who supported 
the PKK for many years, due to the 
deep divergences of opinion, between 
Turkey and the NATO allies, as to how 
to deal with the PKK terrorism.
Starting from the mid-1980s, in additi-
on to the Armenian terrorist organizati-
on ASALA, which was responsible for 
the assassination of more than 30 Tur-
kish diplomats, Syria has supported 
the PKK terrorist organization that wa-
ged irregular warfare against the Tur-
kish security forces with the objective 
of separating the southeastern parts of 
the country, which is heavily populated 
with the Kurdish citizens of Turkey. 
The head of the PKK, namely Abdullah 
Öcalan, was able to run his terror orga-
nization from his apartment in Damas-
cus, Syria’s capital city.
Despite its Kurdish separatist rhetoric, 
the PKK specifically targeted Kurdish 
villagers who have not supported their 
separatist claims and killed civilians, 
including women and children. 
At the beginning, Turkey was caught 
unprepared to effectively counter such 
attacks. The security forces had to be 
reorganized, restructured, and redep-
loyed so as to develop a military ca-
pability commensurate with the dimen-
sions of the threat posed by the PKK 
to the security of the citizens and the 
unity of the nation.
By the time the PKK emerged as a 
major security problem for Turkey, the 
primary concern of the Turkish military 
was the threat perceived from the So-
viet Union. Hence, the task of conduc-
ting counterterrorist operations was left 
to the Gendarmerie and the Police until 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
PKK’s attacks on the villages and the 
fighting between the security units and 
the PKK terrorists claimed the lives of 
tens of thousands of people on both si-
des over a decade until the mid-1990s. 
The Turkish General Staff took over the 
responsibility to conduct the counter-
terrorism campaign since 1994 and 
brought to an end with the capture 
of Öcalan in February 1999. Getting 
this result, however, was not easy and 
brought Turkey and Syria to the brink 
of war.
Difficulties in Deterring Syria from 
Supporting the PKK
Turkey had warned Syria, time and 
again, on its support to the PKK (and 
to the Armenian terrorist organization 
ASALA, previously). Nevertheless, 
the Syrian authorities, throughout the 
1980s and also 1990s, have taken 
none of Turkey’s warnings seriously. 
Whenever a Turkish prime minister or a 
president sent a formal letter to the Sy-
rian president Hafez Al Assad, asking 
him to stop giving support to the PKK, 
Assad looked at the troop concentrati-
on level of the Turkish Army across the 
border and saw literally nothing that 
would make him scared of the possi-
bility of a Turkish incursion into Syria. 
Hence, Turkey was not able to push the 
Syrian leadership toward cooperation 
any further partly because of the lack 
of enough military capability along the 
Syrian border that could be put behind 
the political stance toward Syria. 
This was also partly due to the war-
nings of especially the European 
members of NATO advising Turkey to 
stay away from getting involved in any 
conflict with its Middle Eastern neigh-
bors, due to their fear of escalation to 
a conflict between NATO and the War-
saw Pact because of the close links of 
the Soviet Union and Syria.
To put it simply, NATO member Turkey 
could not deter Syria from supporting 
the PKK because of its responsibilities 
arising from being a NATO member! 
Sounds strange! But, let’s see why and 
how that was the case:
Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu from Bil-
kent University used to say that when 
Turkey joined NATO, the parties tacitly 
agreed that Turkey would help contain 
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the Soviet Union. Should deterrence have failed, Turkey would 
have made its facilities available to NATO and would have dis-
tracted as many Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in 
Central Europe.
In other words, Turkey risked its own devastation and invasi-
on as a NATO ally by sitting in the immediate neighborhood 
of the Soviet Union simply because the military thinking of the 
Alliance focused on the central front as the main area of Soviet-
Warsaw Pact threat, putting an overwhelming emphasis on the 
contingency of a massive attack through Germany into Western 
Europe. NATO’s strategic calculations developed around this 
priority, and Turkey’s contribution was considered in function of 
such a contingency.
Turkish Army, largest in NATO after the United States, tied down 
around 25-30 Warsaw Pact divisions on the Soviet and the Bul-
garian borders. Due to the fact that the Soviet Red Army had to 
deploy a sizeable portion of its capabilities in the Georgian, Ar-
menian, and Azerbaijani Soviet Republics neighboring Turkey’s 
eastern provinces, its ability to launch a powerful assault on the 
Western European nations had diminished significantly. 
On the contrary, the ability of the Soviet Union to invade large 
segments of the Turkish territory from the east had grown con-
siderably. Moreover, the Soviet Army across the border needed 
only a few days to get ready in order to launch a surprise attack 
on Turkey.
Now let’s see how Turkey’s NATO membership had serious imp-
lications for its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors.
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Middle East as NATO’s “Out-of-Area” 
Since the early days of the creation of 
the Republic in 1923, Turkish political 
and security elite saw the Middle East 
as a zone of intricacies that must be 
stayed away from interfering with lo-
cal political and military affairs. This 
has been one of the unwritten rules of 
Turkish foreign policy for most of the 
twentieth century. 
Turkey’s membership in NATO has 
further consolidated the policy of sta-
ying aloof from Middle Eastern politics. 
The impact of NATO was mainly due to 
the limitations in its primary area of res-
ponsibility, which had originally exclu-
ded the Middle East. 
In the eyes of the most Western Euro-
pean members of NATO, the Middle 
East has long been considered to be 
out of the area of their responsibility to 
defend against the Soviet encroach-
ment, with the exception of some limi-
ted planning covering the oil-rich Gulf 
region. 
There were a number of reasons for 
considering the Middle East as ‘‘out-
of-area.’’ First and foremost, the North 
Atlantic Alliance was formed, in the 
first place, against the threats posed 
by the Soviet Union to the Western Eu-
ropean nations, even if it was not expli-
citly stated in the text of the Treaty. 
Hence, anything that would increase 
the threat level perceived from the So-
viet Union and the Warsaw Pact would 
be unacceptable to especially the 
Western European members of NATO. 
In this respect, Turkey’s relations with 
its Middle Eastern neighbors, parti-
cularly Syria and Iraq, both of which 
were close friends of the Soviet Union, 
would carry the risk of involvement of 
the Soviets in any conflict between 
them and Turkey.
Turkey’s relations with Syria and Iraq 
were not good, not only because of 
their support to the PKK but also be-
cause of the deep divergences of opi-
nions regarding, for instance, the ways 
and means of using of the waters of 
the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers that 
are originating from Turkey and flowing 
through the Syrian and Iraqi territories 
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Moreover, Turkey and Syria have also disagreed 
over the status of Hatay district of Turkey, which 
was annexed to Turkey in 1939 after a period of 
French occupation when Syria was governed un-
der the French mandate following the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1920. 
Hence, if Turkey entered in a conflict with Syria 
and/or Iraq because of such contentious issues, 
and if NATO had to honor its Article 5 commitment 
and involved in the conflict on the side of Turkey, 
the Soviet Union would most likely side with its 
Middle Eastern allies Syria and Iraq. 
Such eventualities would run the risk of escalation 
of a bilateral local conflict to one between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, and also possibly to a su-
perpower confrontation that might even lead to a 
nuclear exchange. 
No members of NATO would, therefore, like a 
conflict between Turkey and Syria or Iraq to bre-
ak out that could pave the way to an East-West 
confrontation. 
With these in mind, Turkey was advised (informal-
ly though) by its NATO allies not to act in such a 
way that would cause a confrontation with Middle 
Eastern neighbors and to keep the profile of its 
relations low with the regional states.
Another reason why Turkey’s membership in 
NATO has further consolidated Turkish policy to 
remain aloof from the region was Turkey’s force 
posture, which heavily depended on the threat 
perceived from the Soviet Union on the northe-
astern frontier and Bulgaria on the northwestern 
frontier. 
The bulk of Turkey’s military capabilities were al-
located to the contingencies involving a Soviet 
offensive on Turkey’s eastern provinces, possibly 
with a concomitant attack of Bulgaria from the Th-
race region. 
As such, Turkey was left with hardly any meanin-
gful military capability, especially the land forces 
that could be deployed along its southern and 
southeastern frontiers neighboring Syria, Iraq, 
and Iran. 
Considering the role of the military power in bac-
king political decisions, number one rule of effe-
ctive deterrence, Turkey’s ability to deter its ne-
ighbors from advancing their policies, such as 
supporting terrorism that were damaging Turkish 
national interests was limited because of the limi-
ted military capabilities, which couldn’t be alloca-
ted to contingencies that would involve its Middle 
Eastern neighbors.
To be continued …
Considering the role of the military 
power in backing political decisions, 
number one rule of effective deterrence, 
Turkey’s ability to deter its neighbors 
from advancing their policies, such 
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damaging Turkish national interests was 
limited because of the limited military 
capabilities, which couldn’t be allocated 
to contingencies that would involve its 
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